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Abstract
Can someone’s willingness to contribute to a public good or charity be associated with
their attitudes and behavior towards COVID-19 regulations? This experimental economics paper
examines the connection between cooperation with regulations and charitable giving using a
public goods game. While many studies have looked at what affects contributions in public
goods games and many others have examined charitable givings outside the laboratory setting,
few studies have examined if and how contributions in a public goods game and outside the
laboratory setting are related.
The COVID-19 Pandemic created a unique opportunity to study the relationship between
subjects’ decisions inside and outside the public goods game. Subjects’ attitudes and behavior
toward COVID-19 protocols were measured using a survey that asked them about their attitudes
and behavior toward various situations that could arise during the Pandemic. Willingness to
contribute to public goods and charities were measured using a public goods game, which
utilized veconlab’s Experimental Economics website. The answers given in the survey and the
actions in the public goods game were compared to determine if there is a relationship between
the willingness to contribute in a public goods game and one’s desire to contribute to lower
levels of COVID-19 circulation.
This study finds a relationship between peoples’ actions inside and outside the laboratory.
However, this paper finds a significant negative relationship between subjects’ behaviors
towards COVID-19 outside the laboratory and their actions inside the laboratory. In contrast,
there is a mostly significant positive relationship between peoples’ attitudes towards COVID-19
and their actions inside the laboratory.
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Introduction
This project addresses whether an association exists between one’s willingness to
contribute to a public good in the public goods game and outside the laboratory by adhering to
COVID-19 protocols. The main goal of this research project is to see if the results from public
goods games can predict peoples’ actions outside the laboratory when it comes to contributing or
not to a public good. This Pandemic has created an opportunity to look at if and how the
provision of decreasing the risk of COVID-19 and the public goods game are associated with
each other. It is important to understand if and how the public goods game can predict peoples’
actions regarding public goods outside the laboratory setting and few studies have investigated
this relationship thus far. Public goods games started being conducted to create a simplified and
controlled environment similar to public goods outside the laboratory and study peoples’
behaviors towards them, meaning their contributions or lack thereof to public goods. This study
looks to see if the laboratory public goods game can be used to predict peoples’ actions outside
the laboratory setting.
The public goods game measures subjects’ willingness to contribute to a public good
inside the laboratory. Subjects’ contributions outside the laboratory were measured using a
survey that asked subjects about their attitudes and behaviors towards COVID-19 guidelines.
Subjects’ behaviors towards COVID-19 were measured using questions about their willingness
to contribute to lower levels of COVID-19 circulation by wearing a mask, social distancing, and
getting vaccinated outside the laboratory. Subjects’ attitudes towards COVID-19 were measured
using questions about what they would do in hypothetical situations or how they would advise
someone they knew in certain situations. Subjects’ attitudes and behaviors were then compared
to their contributions to a public good in the public goods game played on veconlab
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Experimental Economics website to determine if ones attitudes and behaviors towards COVID19 could be predicted using their actions during a public goods game.
A public good is a good that is non-rival, meaning that one’s consumption of the good
does not affect another’s. A public good is also non-excludable because it is difficult and
sometimes impossible to keep non-payers from consuming it, making it challenging to keep
people from consuming the good for any reason. Therefore, it is challenging to fund public
goods, especially by a private business. Once provided, consumers can freeride by consuming
the public good without paying for it. An example of this is national defense because one portion
of the population cannot be defended while the rest is unprotected. Due to the public goods being
non-rival and non-excludable, it is predicted that rational people will not contribute to the public
goods and will free ride, but people do not tend to free ride as researchers had hypothesized.
A public goods game was developed to study peoples’ choices about providing a public
good in a controlled and simplified setting. In a simple public goods game, subjects are endowed
with a predetermined number of tokens and they choose how much to donate to the provision of
the public good. The amount contributed is then multiplied by a factor and divided equally
among the subjects, regardless of the subject’s contribution. Multiple rounds of this are done
with the same group of subjects, who will get the same amount of tokens bestowed to them each
round. Each round is similar to receiving a new paycheck where subjects need to allocate to two
different things. There is a trade-off because a subject can keep the resources they did not
contribute, and there is no guarantee that the other subjects will also contribute to the public
good. This game is meant to measure contribution between a group of subjects because it is in a
subject’s best interest to freeride, contributing nothing, while others contribute to the public
good. However, the group does benefit from contribution because the group’s contribution is
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multiplied by a factor, such as two or three, and distributed equally among group members,
creating a net gain.
For example, four subjects are placed in a group. Each player is endowed with 10 tokens,
and three subjects contribute 5 tokens to the public good, while the other subject contributes
nothing, so there is a total of 15 tokens contributed. The 15 tokens contributed to the public fund
are multiplied by 2 to have a total of 30 tokens in the public fund to be distributed to all four
players. After being distributed equally among the four subjects in the group, three of the
subjects will have 12.5 tokens because they kept 5 tokens they did not contribute and received
7.5 tokens as a ¼ share of the 30 total tokens in the public good. The subject who did not
contribute will have 17.5 tokens because they kept the 10 tokens they started with and gained 7.5
tokens from the ¼ share of the 30 total tokens in the public good.
In this example, there is a net and an individual benefit because the total tokens in the
group increased, and the number of tokens each player finished the round with increased from
their initial endowment. Still, the subjects who contributed five tokens are less well off than the
player who did not contribute. The person who did not contribute got the highest payoff by free
riding, letting others contribute while reaping the benefits of their other group members’
contributions. There is an individual incentive to freeride, which subjects begin to realize
throughout the experiment as the total contributions to the public good generally tend to decrease
from one round to the next.
The risk of virus circulation is a public good because it is both non-excludable and nonrival. One person’s consumption of the level of risk does not affect another’s, and it is
challenging to keep people from consuming the level of risk, even if they have not undertaken
the costs of decreasing the risk. The COVID-19 vaccination, wearing masks, and social
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distancing are costs associated with the level of the public good, decreasing circulation of
COVID-19. People can choose to pay the price to reduce the circulation of COVID-19 or not
while still reaping the benefits of others doing so, and the one person’s consumption of the level
of risk of COVID-19 is not affected by another’s consumption.
The following section will explain existing literature on the research that has already
been conducted in relation to this research study. After the literature review, the methodology of
this study is explained, which is followed by the results of the study. There is then a discussion
of the results and concluding remarks are made about the study, which includes further research
that could be conducted on the topic.
Literature Review
Results in Standard Public Goods Games
The public goods game has been used to study cooperation under various circumstances
in a controlled and abstract environment (Marwell and Ames, 1980; Andreoni, 1988). Many have
theorized the free-rider hypothesis (Andreoni, 1988). However, it has been discovered in the
early stages of a game that subjects usually contribute between 30 and 70 percent of their total
endowment instead of the hypothesized 0 percent (Ledyard, 1995). Marwell and Ames also
added to the literature in 1980, showing that groups would typically invest 57% of their
resources, which was 28% more than was needed to reach a provision point, meaning that
subjects do not fit the predicted free rider hypothesis (1980). Even when Marwell and Ames also
increased subjects’ endowments and studied experienced subjects, who had already participated
in a public goods game, they found that subjects tended to free ride less than expected (1980).
Early experiments found that subjects were not acting as experimenters had theorized rational,
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self-interested subjects would act by contributing nothing to the public good (Marwell and Ames,
1980).
Three different types of subjects have been identified: free riders, unconditional
cooperators, and reciprocators (Chaudhuri, 2011). Free riders do not contribute to gain from
others’ contributions to the public good (Chaudhuri, 2011). Unconditional cooperators contribute
to the public goods, whether or not the others in their group also contribute (Chaudhuri, 2011).
Finally, reciprocators’ contribution to the public good is conditional or dependent on others’
contributions (Burlando, 2005; Chaudhuri, 2011). Urs Fischbacher and Simon Gachter also
found that this group of subjects contains ‘“imperfect conditional cooperators’ who only partly
match others’ contributions” (2010, p. 3), which can explain why contributions decline over time
(2010). James Andreoni finds that the learning hypothesis could also explain why there is a
general decline in contributions because subjects learn the free-rider incentive by participating in
the game (1988). However, his experiment shows that subjects continue to contribute to the
public good even after understanding the free-rider incentive, so learning alone cannot explain
the general decline in contributions (1988). Many experiments have expanded on this
knowledge and manipulated the game to represent various circumstances subjects may encounter
outside the laboratory.
The Effect of Personality Traits and Personal Values on Choices in Public Goods Games
Researchers have expanded on the basic public goods games to look at how personality
traits and personal values can explain subjects’ choices within public goods games. A study was
done by Stefan Volk et al. (2011), which looked at individual differences in personality traits and
personal values, and subjects’ contribution in the public goods game and found that
agreeableness was a strong predictor of cooperation and contribution. Agreeableness is one of
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the Big Five personality traits, which describes someone who gets along well with others, is
optimistic, friendly, and warm. Their results also suggest that subjects with weak social values
tend to free ride in the public goods game. Researchers also found that “personal values did not
uniquely contribute to the prediction of the cooperation preferences above and beyond what was
already accounted for in personality” (p. 814).
Many people exhibit social preferences, such as reciprocal fairness, so they are not only
motivated by material self-interest or the monetary payoff they will receive at the end of the
game (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002; Englmaier and Gebhardt, 2011). Simon Anderson states that
the conflicting interest that may affect subjects’ actions are their “care about how well they do
relative to others (envy, fairness), or about how well others do (altruism), or they may be riskaverse” (1998). Urs Fischbacher and Simon Gachter found that subjects tend to contribute more
than predicted “not solely due to inexperience but to social preferences” (2006, p. 33).
Social desirability is the desire to present oneself positively, so people tend to overreport
positive characteristics and under-report negative traits (Fleming and Zizzo, 2011). Piers
Fleming and Daniel Zizzo tried to explain why people often contribute to the public good even
when it is not in their best interest by looking at social norms and preferences. They found that
subjects interested in being socially desirable contributed more to the public good. In contrast,
others not as interested in social desirability did not contribute as much.
Other studies have taken advantage of people’s desire to perceive themselves positively
to others to increase contributions. James Andreoni and Ragan Petrie (2004) used visual
identification and information about subjects to decrease anonymity between group members and
increase cooperation and contribution. Neither identification nor information about subjects had
a significant effect on their own, but they had a significant impact when put together. Subjects
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contributed all their tokens at least 20% of the time and decreased freeriding. This can be applied
to the real world, where contributions to charities are either recognized or kept anonymous, and
in the COVID-19 Pandemic when wearing masks in public was mandated. Outside the
laboratory, people often act cooperatively when their contributions or lack thereof are more
public (Reindl et al., 2019, 73). Peoples’ contribution to the level of risk of virus circulation by
wearing face coverings in public was very publicized during the Pandemic, just as the
contributions to the public good in this game were also publicized through identification and
information. This could explain why increased cooperation might have decreased the risk of
virus circulation because it was easy to identify contributors and free riders.
Connecting Choices in Public Goods Games to Behavior Outside the Lab
Although the research on the relationship between subjects’ actions inside and outside the
laboratory is relatively recent, some have generally found a correlation between subjects’
behavior inside and outside the public goods game. An experiment done by Florian Englmaier
and Georg Gebhardt (2011) found that subjects’ behavior in the experiment did correlate with
their behavior outside the game in the field. The field experiment used a group of four clerks,
who earned a fixed wage, and given an opportunity to freeride by leaving after their entire group
had entered a pre-specified number of books into a computer system. Due to the fact that entries
were counted on a group instead of individual basis, some clerks could enter fewer books into
the system, while others did most of the work, and then leave after the group’s daily goal was
reached. When comparing clerks’ contribution in the public goods experiment and the field
experiment, they found that even though it is hard to predict behavior based on information about
personality traits, using public goods game contributions as a measure of a personality trait
provided is a stronger correlation, which allows for better prediction of behavior outside the
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public goods experiment. They concluded that this experiment was a good starting point for
extrapolating from the public goods game experiment to the field and the real world, but
extrapolation is not always viable.
In contrast, Matthias Benz and Stephan Meier (2008) found in a long-term study that
tracking contributions in the field and the game over multiple semesters, there was a relatively
weak correlation when accounting for singular situations. There are significant variations in
behavior. The field experiment examined students from the University of Zurich and their
decision to donate to two different charities when they filled out the registration renewal. This
data was compared to students’ choices in a simple public goods game experiment. However,
considering past behavior yields a higher correlation. This is a testament to how much decisions
are sensitive to small changes in context or situations people are placed in inside and outside the
game. They conclude that “individual’s behavior is situationally dependent and challenging to
generalize” (p. 277); however, there is some correlation, between 0.25 and 0.4, which they find
to be relatively high given the circumstances of what they were measuring.
Another study, done more recently by Reindl et al. (2019), also found that subjects who
free rode in the public goods game were significantly more likely to freeride in the field. This
study was done in a class with business administration students at the University of Vienna, who
took part in three group projects in groups of three to five students over a semester. At the end of
the course, subjects were asked to complete a survey about group participation, so participation
was somewhat challenging to measure subjectively. In the experiment, 19.8% of subjects were
identified as free-riders whose contributions were below average when considering the quality of
their work and the time they put into it. When asked to donate to a public good or charity, 66.9%
of the identified free riders were unwilling to donate, 14% were willing to donate half, and
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19.1% were willing to contribute the total amount. They also found that an additional free rider
in a group tended to cause an increase in others’ contributions in an act to compensate for the
free rider’s low contributions.
Trends During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 Pandemic, research has been conducted on the
trends of peoples’ behaviors and attitudes towards the virus, which can be used to inform the
hypothesis of this research project. David Anaki and Jamie Sergay (2021) used an online
convenience survey performed in March of 2020 to find that men and women are equally scared
of COVID-19. Additionally, people report taking at least four preventative measures, such as
washing one’s hands and wearing face coverings. This survey found that between 68% and 83%
of people intend to comply with health authorities, but washing one’s hands, which was the
highest reported preventative measure employed by subjects, was only exercised by 62% of the
population (Anaki and Sergay, 2021). Using a similar online survey format, Volker Thoma et al.
found that knowledge of symptoms cannot predict reported behavior (2021). Even if someone
knows what the symptoms of COVID-19 are, it does not mean that they will follow
recommended precautions.
Madison Stoddard and her fellow scientists used game theory to determine that noncompliance is embedded in human nature (2021). Individuals can justify not complying with
COVID-19 protocols using their own perceived costs and benefits. Subjects perceive the costs
and benefits of compliance and non-compliance and believe their risk of infection is lower than
average. Underestimating one’s level of risk leads to subjects minimizing the potential costs of
non-compliance and could lead to non-compliance with COVID-19 protocols.
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Buso et al. go a step further than Madison Stoddard et al. by looking at peoples’ behavior
during lockdowns when people are forced to self-isolate (2020). This study used a public goods
game and an ultimatum game, where subjects made a simple one-time decision about their level
of isolation to examine their level of cooperation. Buso found that “participants are more selfish
in the ultimatum bargaining and contribute more to the public good when social isolation is
stronger. However, cooperation decreases when lockdown is longer” (p. 1). They believe this is
because people feel a decrease in social embeddedness.
In addition to Bruso’s findings, S. van Baal finds that subjects are more likely to selfisolate as more players are infected (2021). Baal’s experiment had a group of people, one of
which was randomly marked as infected. The infected individual was concealed from everyone,
including themselves, and subjects decided how much they wanted to isolate themselves. S. van
Baal also finds that players conform to social norms by self-isolating more than the researchers
predicted. When facing social dilemmas, many individuals prefer to follow examples of
successful behavior rather than social norms if the two are not the same. People study what
others are doing to be successful and do it themselves (Burton-Chellew, 2021).

Methodology
This study was conducted between February 24th and March 4th of 2022. At the time
these sessions were run, the number of COVID-19 cases was decreasing, and had been
decreasing since January 2022. Although people were still required to wear masks in buildings
on the University of Vermont Campus, where participants for this study were recruited from, the
mask mandate inside buildings in and around the Burlington area had been lifted and many
businesses had transitioned to being mask optional. Additionally, just a week and a half after the
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experimental sessions were concluded by an email on March 16, 2022, that the mask mandate
would be lifted indoors as of March 19, 2022.
During this study period, participants were asked to attend a one hour research session on
the University of Vermont campus. Upon subjects’ arrival at the experimental session, they were
provided with a small notecard containing the name of the website they would use to participate
in the game, their ID number, which they would use through the session, the link to a survey
participants completed at the beginning of the session, and a session name they will use to enter
the online interactive game.
Once everyone had arrived, subjects were given an information sheet, which was used to
establish consent with each participant before proceeding with the experimental session. The
information sheet subjects were given can be found in Appendix A. Please note that the public
goods game was referred to as an online interactive game throughout the experimental session,
which includes all the instructions participants received. After obtaining consent from each
subject, they were asked to proceed to the link listed on their notecard. They were asked to
complete a survey on Google Forms consisting of questions about their attitudes and behaviors
towards COVID-19 regulations. In Appendix B, the questions subjects were asked are provided.
The following disclaimer was provided at the top of the survey: “Please answer the following
questions as honestly as you can. No actions will be taken for any responses you provide. The
responses you provide will be kept confidential”, which was provided to elicit the most honest
responses from participants.
After completing the survey, subjects were provided with an instructions sheet, which
was read aloud to subjects. This instructions sheet can be found in Appendix C. The instructions
sheet explained the public goods game procedure, the valuation scheme of tokens for both the

Clark 14
private and public fund, the method of payment, and an example of payoffs given various
contribution levels. Each group was made up of eight participants, who remained in the same
group throughout the public goods game. Each public goods game consisted of twelve rounds,
where each participant received twelve tokens at the beginning of each round. Each token was
valued at $1.00 if kept in the private fund. Each token contributed to the public found was
multiplied by two before being divided equally between all eight group members regardless of
the tokens they had contributed in the round. Consequently, the value each group member
received for each token in the public fund was $0.25.
The instructions also stated that each participant would receive $6.00 for completing the
session. In addition, subjects would also be compensated for one round of the public goods game
chosen randomly via the roll of a die. Doing so made it unknown to participants which round
they would be compensated for, meaning they would have the same incentives for each round
and not act differently for the round they would be paid for (Ledyard, 1995). This is also
considered standard practice in many public goods games’ experiments (Ledyard, 1995).
In the example round, the number of tokens each player contributed and kept for their
personal fund was displayed, as well as the total amount of tokens contributed, the amount each
player received from the public fund, and their total earnings for the example round. It was also
explained to participants that they would only be informed of the total number of tokens
contributed to the public fund and their earnings for the round at the conclusion of each round.
They would not be able to see the amount other participants had contributed, and no one would
know how much they had contributed. It was also made clear during the instructions that tokens
could not be transferred to other rounds.
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After the instructions were read, participants were asked to complete a quiz question to
demonstrate their understanding of the game and its payoff scheme. The quiz question was an
iteration of the example round provided to participants previously. Players’ contributions and
total contributions had changed from the example round, and they need to determine players’
total tokens at the end of the chosen round. Each participant had to answer the quiz question
correctly before the group continued to the game setup. Participants were able to ask further
questions and consult the example round to answer the questions correctly.
After all participants had answered the quiz question correctly, the group proceeded to
the Online Platform Setup. Here, instructions were given about accessing the veconlab website
and the online session, creating an account on the veconlab website, and making and confirming
decisions once the online public goods game had begun. These instructions can be found in
Appendix D. Veconlab is a site with various experimental economics simulations used for
teaching and research purposes, one of which is a public goods game. Once participants had
navigated to veconlab’s website, they used a Session ID to log into the same group of eight
people. Then they set up an account and read through instructions provided by the website about
the game before proceeding to the game. It is important to note that participants used an ID
number provided on the note cards they were given upon their arrival as their first name and
“UVM” as their last name when creating an account. This was done to ensure participants’
identities remained confidential and ensured they were comfortable making decisions knowing
they would remain anonymous.
Once the game had begun, meaning that all participants had entered the session using the
session ID, created an account, read the instructions provided by veconlab about the public goods
game, and answered two questions asked by the website about the game, players encountered
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drop-down menus that allowed them to choose how much of their endowment they wanted to
contribute to the public fund and how much they wanted to keep in their personal fund. They
could choose any whole number ranging from zero tokens to twelve tokens to contribute to the
public fund, the rest of which would go to their personal fund. Once all group members had
submitted a decision, each player was able to see the amount of total tokens contributed to the
public fund, how many they chose to contribute to the public fund and keep in their personal
fund as an individual, and the total dollar amount they had at the end of the round keeping each
player’s decision anonymous from the rest of the group.
Once all twelve rounds of the public goods game were completed, one of the participants
rolled a twelve-sided die to determine which round subjects would be compensated for.
Participants were then thanked for their time, receipts for each subject’s payment were prepared,
and payment was provided in cash after participants’ receipts had been signed before they
departed.
The experimental design was approved by the IRB and funded through the University of
Vermont’s Honors College Thesis Mini-Grant funding. This funding was used to pay subjects
based on their performance in the public goods game. Compensation is an essential aspect of
experimental economics papers because subjects are not compensated equally but based on how
well they performed in the experiment. Paying subjects based on their performance in the game
allows experimenters to simulate a more realistic situation than they would without payments
based on the subject’s performance in the game and incentivizes subjects to perform as they
would in similar cases outside the game.
A total of 22 undergraduate students from the University of Vermont participated in this
honors thesis research project. An important note for the analysis is that two subjects played the
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game twice. This was done when two groups of eight were scheduled to complete the session,
and many people did not show up when they were scheduled to participate. Despite overbooking
the session, 14 people attended a session when 16 people were needed. Instead of turning away
six participants who had shown up for the session, two participants participated in two sessions
simultaneously. One of the data points from each participant was randomly selected and
dropped, so they were only counted once in the results. Therefore, there were only 22
participants even though there were three groups of eight participants or 24 original data points.
Using the answers each participant provided from the COVID-19 survey questions asked
at the beginning of the session, scores were given to each participant for their attitudes and
behaviors towards COVID-19. Due to the fact that everyone in the sample was vaccinated and
had received their COVID-19 booster shots, questions 2 and 3 were not used in the analysis as
they would not have affected the results by helping identify contributors and free riders.
Questions 5, 6, 7, and 8 were asked to determine subjects’ behaviors during the COVID19 Pandemic. These questions are as follows:
5. Do you wear a mask when you are required to?
a. Yes, all the time.
b. Yes, most of the time.
c. Sometimes.
d. No
6. Do you wear a mask indoors when you are not required to?
a. Yes
b. Most of the time
c. Sometimes
d. No
7. Do you wear a mask outdoors when not required to, but around a group of people?
a. Yes
b. Most of the time
c. Sometimes
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d. No
8. Do you use hand sanitizer and/or wash your hands frequently?
a. Yes, very frequently
b. Yes, frequently
c. Sometimes
d. No
A score of 0 was given to those who chose the answer that represented the least amount
of contribution to limiting the spread of COVID-19. A score of three was given to those who
chose the answer that represented the most contribution to limiting the spread of COVID-19. For
example, for question 5, someone would receive a score of 3 if they selected “Yes, all the time,”
a 2 for choosing “Yes, most of the time,” a 1 for answering “Sometimes,” and a 0 for “No.” The
scores subjects received based on their answers to questions 4, 5, 6, and 7 were then added
together to get a score out of 12 for their behavior. This variable will be referred to as behavior
throughout the remainder of this analysis.
Questions 4, 9, 10, and 11 were asked to determine subjects’ attitudes about the COVID19 Pandemic. These questions are as follows:
4. If you have received the COVID-19 vaccination, would you have received it if no one
required you to be vaccinated?
a. Yes
b. No
c. Not Applicable. I have not received the COVID-19 vaccination.
9. Would you encourage someone you know to get vaccinated if they had not yet received
their vaccination?
a. No, I would not encourage them to get vaccinated.
b. Only if I know the well enough would I encourage them to get vaccinated.
c. Yes, I would encourage them to get vaccinated.
10. Suppose your friend is feeling symptoms of COVID-19 and has been tested but is waiting
the results. What would you advice you friend to do?
a. Isolate until test result is received.
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b. Try to isolate and wear a mask indoors when they are around others until test
results are received.
c. It is okay to continue with daily activities until test results are received.
11. If you have been in contact with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19, what
would you do?
a. I would not get tested and continue conducting my day normally, unless I started
showing symptoms of COVID-19.
b. I would get tested for COVID-19 and conduct my day normally until a positive
test result was given.
c. I would get tested for COVID-19 and isolate myself until a negative test result
was received.
Similar to the methods used to determine behavior, a score of 0 was given when the
answer represented the lowest contribution to decreasing the risk of contracting or spreading
COVID-19. A score of 2 was given to the answers that represented the most contribution due to
the fact that there were only three possible answers to questions 9, 10, and 11 instead of four.
Question 4 had only two possible answers, yes and no; a subject would or would not have
received the COVID-19 vaccine if they had not been required. This question was asked because
students of the University of Vermont, the population this project sampled from, were required to
become fully vaccinated and later receive booster shots for COVID-19 to attend unless they had
circumstance which made them unable to receive it. Subjects received a score of zero if they
answered no and two if they answered yes to question 4. The scores subjects received for their
answers to questions 4, 9, 10, and 11 were added together to get a total score out of 8 for attitude.
This variable will be referred to as attitude through the remainder of this paper.
Regression analysis was performed on the behavior and attitude variables to predict
contributions. Before conducting a multiple regression analysis, variables are tested for
multicollinearity because it is expected that behavior and attitude will be closely related to each
other. If the VIF of behavior and attitude variables is too high (above 3.00), then simple
regression models will be created for attitude and behavior to predict contributions from rounds
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1, 11, 12, and average across all rounds. If the VIF of the behavior and attitude variable is low
(below 3.00), a multiple regression analysis will be conducted, where attitude and behavior are
used to predict contributions in rounds 1, 11, 12, and average contributions across rounds.
Round 1 is analyzed to determine the subjects’ initial contribution before knowing what
other players will also contribute. Round 12 and average contributions across all twelve rounds
are analyzed to determine how the subjects learn throughout the game and how their
contributions change over time. Round 11 was added to the analysis as a dependent variable after
determining the pattern of contributions is not typical for round 12. In two of the three sessions
conducted, round 12 was different from round 11.

Results
Results from Public Goods Game
The contributions made in all three sessions were compiled into one graph to determine
each round’s overall contributions, found in Figure 1. Average contributions in the first round
were 5.23 tokens, and an average of 6.05 tokens were contributed in the final round. A two-tailed
t-test determines that this was an insignificant increase (p-value = 0.433) in contributions from
round one to round twelve. There was also an insignificant increase (p-value = 0.369) in
contributions from the first to the eleventh round (average contributions in round eleven were
5.68).
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Figure 1: Overall Average Contributions

With the results from overall contributions from all three sessions in mind, further
analysis must be done on each session to determine if there are outliers skewing the results which
contradict those of the other studies that are similar in nature. Other studies, done by Urs
Fischbacher and Simon Gachter (2010), and James Andreoni (1988) and more find that
contributions decrease over time. In contrast, this study observes an insignificant increase in
contributions from the first to the final round.
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During the first session, the average contributions made by subjects start at 3.25 tokens.
In general, contributions increase as the game went on, with a large spike in contributions
(average contributions were 7.75) in the final round. A graph of the average contributions by
players in the first session can be found in Figure 2. Conducting a two-tailed t-test on the first
and last round, one can find that there is a significant increase (p-value = 0.045) in contributions
from the first round to round twelve. There is no significant (p-value = 0.265) difference in
contributions from the first round to round eleven.
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Figure 2: Session 1 Average Contributions
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A graph of the average contributions in the second session can be found in Figure 3. In
the second session there was a slight decrease in contributions from the first to the final round of
the game; average contributions were 6.00 in the first round and 5.71 in the final round.
However, this decrease is considered insignificant (p-value = 0.522). There is also no difference
(p-value = 1) in contributions from the first round to round eleven (contributions were 6.00 in
round eleven).
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Figure 3: Session 2 Average Contributions
A graph of the average contributions in the third session can be found in Figure 4. In the
third session, average contributions started at 6.71 tokens, and in the twelfth round, contributions
were on average 4.43 tokens. This is not a significant decrease (p-value = 0.192) in
contributions. In the eleventh round, there was an average of 7.29 tokens contributed. However,
this is an insignificant increase (p-value = 0.700) in contributions from the first round when a
two-tailed t-test is run.
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Figure 4: Session 3 Average Contributions
These results contradict those of other studies done that are similar in nature to the public
goods game conducted in this project. Contribution does not significantly decrease in any of the
sessions. Further investigation was done to see if there were a few participants who may have
skewed the results. A graph of contributions each participant made in each round during the first
session can be found in Figure 5. A graph of each player’s contributions in each round in the
second and third session can be found in Figures 6 and 7, respectively. A variety of types of
contributors participated in this study. For example, ID5 is an unconditional contributor who
contributes their entire endowment no matter what other players contribute. ID8 can also be
identified as a free rider who contributed nothing no matter what other players contributed. ID19
can be identified as someone who continually changes their contribution.
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Figure 7: Session 3 Contributions
Using this information, one can determine what percentage of subjects increased,
decreased, and maintained the same contributions from the first to the last two rounds. Using
Table 1, one can see that 27.3% of contributions are greater in the twelfth round than their initial
contributions in the first round, and 36.4% of contributions by players are greater in the eleventh
round than their initial contributions. We can also see that only 40.9% of players contributed less
in the twelfth round than in the first round, and 22.7% of players contributed less in the eleventh
round than in the first round. Finally, 31.8% of players contributed the same amount in the first
and last round, and 40.9% of players contributed equal amounts in the first and eleventh round of
the public goods game. These results show that there were not just a few participants acting
different than expected by either contributing the same amount or more than they had in the first
round; there were quite a few.
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Change in Participant Contributions from the First to The Eleventh and Twelfth Round
Round 11

Round 12

Contributions Less than Round 1

22.7%

40.9%

Contributions Equal to Round 1

40.9%

31.8%

Contributions Greater than Round 1

36.4%

27.3%

Table 1: Change in Participant Contributions from the First to The Eleventh and Twelfth Round

Results from COVID-19 Survey
Summary statistics were determined and are presented in Table 2 to begin the analysis of
the COVID-19 survey data. The mean attitude for all 22 participants was 6.50, and the standard
error was 1.37. Attitude represents what people believe they or the people they know should do
in contributing to lower levels of COVID-19 circulation or not. Additionally, the minimum score
received by a participant for the attitude variable was 2, and the maximum score received was 8
out of 8 possible points. For behavior, the mean score was 6.73, and the standard error was 2.41.
The behavior variable described peoples’ behaviors towards COVID-19 protocols, which include
wearing a mask when one is required to or practicing good hand hygiene. Additionally, the
minimum score received by a participant for the behavior variable was 3, while the maximum
score received was 12 out of 12 possible points.
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Summary of Behavior and Attitude
Mean

Standard Error

Minimum

Maximum

Attitude (0-8)

6.50

1.37

2

8

Behavior (0-12)

6.73

2.41

3

12

Table 2: Summary of Behavior and Attitude
A graph of the behavior and attitude variables was produced to investigate whether there
is a positive and highly correlated relationship between the two variables. The graph of behavior
and attitudes is shown in Figure 8. There is a positive correlation between behavior and attitudes
of 0.56, which can be considered moderate. The two variables were then tested for
multicollinearity to determine whether a simple or multiple regression was more appropriate. It is
determined that the VIF is 1.46, which is low enough that a multiple regression analysis could be
conducted.
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Multiple regression analysis is conducted to determine the relationship between
participants’ contributions and their attitude and behavior towards COVID-19. This information
can be found in Table 3a and 3b. There are three columns for the contributions in rounds 1, 11,
12, and average contribution. The columns labeled B contains the coefficients used to make
predictions. The standard error is in the second column, and the third column shows the p-value
or the level of significance.
Behavior, and attitude are significant predictors of contributions during rounds 1, 11, and
average contributions. In round 12, however, attitude was not a significant predictor of
contributions for the twelfth round (p-value = 0.114), while behavior was (p-value = 0.078). This
could be due to it being the final round of the game. Participants are not incentivized to maintain
a relationship with their group members as they did in other rounds when there would be
subsequent rounds to reap the benefits of others’ contributions to the public fund.
Round 1 Contribution
Average Contributions
Standard
Standard
B
P-value
B
P-value
Error
Error
Intercept
2.16
4.21
0.614
4.79
3.00
0.127
Behavior
-0.99
0.43
0.035
-1.08
0.31
0.003
Attitude
1.49
0.77
0.065
1.21
0.55
0.040
Table 3a: Multiple Regression of Rounds 1, and average and Behaviors and Attitudes
Round 11 Contribution
Round 12 Contributions
Standard
Standard
B
P-value
B
P-value
Error
Error
Intercept
4.26
3.83
0.279
2.80
4.90
0.571
Behavior
-0.99
0.40
0.021
-0.94
0.51
0.078
Attitude
1.25
0.70
0.089
1.47
0.89
0.114
Table 3b: Multiple Regression of Rounds 11, and 12 and Behaviors and Attitudes

Discussion

Clark 30
Results from this study indicate that there is a relationship between one’s contributions
during the public goods game, and their attitudes and behavior towards contributing to lowering
the spread of COVID-19. However, some results contradict this study’s hypothesis that those
who contributed during the public goods game would also contribute outside the laboratory
setting. There is evidence that contributions insignificantly increased instead of decreased as the
game continued, which contradicts the findings of other studies which observe that contributions
significantly decrease as the game continues. Additionally, there is a negative relationship
between behavior and contribution from rounds 1, 11, 12, and average contributions across all
twelve rounds, which is unexpected.
Using the regression equation, one can predict the dependent variable, contributions,
using scores for participants’ attitudes and behaviors towards contributing to lower levels of
COVID-19 circulation. Some example predictions of contributions in rounds 1, 11, 12, and
average contributions can be found in Table 4. Suppose someone was a free rider outside the
public goods game and received a score of 0 for both behavior and attitude. In that case, it is
expected that they would contribute about 2.16 tokens to the public fund in the first round, 4.26
tokens in the eleventh round, and 2.80 tokens in the twelfth round. On average, they would
contribute about 4.79 tokens each round during the game. This model also predicts that someone
who selected the answer that represented the most contributions to limiting the spread of
COVID-19, receiving a score of 12 for behavior and 8 for attitude, would contribute 2.2 tokens
in the first round, 2.38 tokens in the eleventh round, 3.28 tokens in the twelfth round, and 1.51
tokens on average. One final example of the predictions these multiple regression models make
about the relationship between attitude and behavior and contributions is if they had scored for
behavior and attitude similar to partial contributors. For example, if someone received a score of
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six for attitudes and behavior. This regression model predicts that they would contribute 5.16
tokens in the first round, 5.82 tokens in the eleventh round, 5.98 tokens in the twelfth round, and
5.57 tokens on average.
Behavior

Attitude

Round 1
Round 11
Round 12
Average
Contribution Contribution Contribution Contribution
Prediction
Prediction
Prediction

0

0

2.16

4.26

2.80

4.79

12

8

2.20

2.38

3.28

1.51

6

6

5.16

5.82

5.98

5.57

Table 4: Contribution Predictions
Although showing significant predicting abilities in most cases, this regression model is a
bit puzzling due to the significant negative sign behavior has for all four measures of
contribution. It would be expected that there would be a positive relationship between one’s
behaviors towards COVID-19 and their contributions during the game. If one contributes more
to limiting the spread of COVID-19 by wearing a mask and practicing good hand hygiene, they
would be considered contributors outside the laboratory. Therefore, those that contributed more
to limiting the spread of COVID-19 would be expected to also contribute more during the public
goods game. However, this negative relationship between behavior and contribution is
contradictory to this hypothesis. This relationship could be due to the small sample size used in
this research project. Having only 22 participants is a small sample size, and a lack of diversity
in the population could cause an unexpected negative relationship. However, more research
would need to be done to determine if this were the case.
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Although results indicate a negative relationship between behavior and contribution,
one’s attitude and contribution are positively correlated. The positive relationship produced by
the multiple regression model suggests that, on average, people who contribute more during the
public goods game have more contributory attitudes about limiting the spread of COVID-19.
With all this in mind, the difference seen between the relationships behavior and attitude
have with contributions could be because one has contributory attitudes but tends not to act on
them, so their attitudes don’t always match their behaviors. For example, one could agree that
getting tested for COVID-19 and isolating themselves until they have received results after
coming in contact with someone who had COVID-19 is a good idea, but in practice, they may
tend not to do this. Knowing the sample taken is college students, maybe they were worried
about missing class or falling behind, and negatively affecting their grades. They could have also
been athletes who didn’t want to let their team down by missing a game, so they convinced
themselves they didn’t need to get tested, or that something like that could never happen to them.
There can be many reasons why someone’s attitudes about the correct behavior and their actual
behavior do not match.
Another reason for a negative relationship between contribution and behavior to be
observed could be due to what was going on with COVID-19 at the time. Due to the timing of
these experimental sessions, participants’ perceived risk of COVID-19 circulation was lower at
the time of the experimental session than it was during the Pandemic. This was also two years
after the start of the Pandemic, so people could have been fed up with continually paying the cost
of limiting the spread of COVID-19, and excited to get back to normalcy. Conducting this study
during the Endemic could have affected peoples’ answers to the survey to be less contributory
for one’s behavior than had the study been conducted during the Pandemic. Instead of observing
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a negative relationship between contribution and behavior, a positive relationship may have
resulted if the study were conducted during the Pandemic.

Conclusion
This experimental economics study examined the relationship between peoples’
contributions in a public goods game and their contributions to public goods outside the
laboratory, such as limiting the spread of COVID-19. The COVID-19 Pandemic, although
destructive in many ways, created an interesting opportunity to study another public good. The
COVID-19 Pandemic affected the world in similar ways. Everyone was expected to help reduce
the risk of COVID-19 circulation by wearing face masks, social distancing, and eventually
receiving a vaccination for the virus. Unlike relatively small-scale public goods, such as parks
and beaches, where the costs of provision vary for different people, making it difficult to know if
someone is not contributing because they are not interested or are freeriding, one’s noncompliance with contributing to lower levels of COVID-19 circulation are more ably identified
as freeriding instead of lack of interest.
It is expected that peoples’ contributions in the public goods game have a positive and
significant relationship with peoples’ contributions outside the public goods game, contributing
to lower levels of COVID-19 circulation. People who contribute more inside the laboratory are
expected to contribute more outside the laboratory. The results support the hypothesis that there
would be a relationship, but not the type of relationship that was expected. There was a
significant and positive relationship between people’s attitudes about limiting the spread of
COVID-19 and their contributions during the public goods game, except for in the final round of
the game, where there was an insignificant positive relationship. However, there was a
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significant and negative relationship between subjects’ behavior about limiting the spread of
COVID-19 and contributions during the public goods game.
There are limitations to this study that should be noted. Having a small sample size
restricts the level of significance of the results, which can explain why the results do not show a
significant decrease in contributions from the first to the final session. Additionally, as noted
above, all the subjects in the study were undergraduate students from the University of Vermont,
so it is possible that these results may not apply to the general population. This study also did not
utilize punishment or publicity in the public goods game like contributing or not to decreasing
the risk of COVID-19 outside the laboratory. Peoples’ contributions towards lower levels of
COVID-19 circulation during the Pandemic was more public because it was easy to tell if
someone was wearing a mask or not. Participants’ contributions in the public goods game are not
as public as their contribution to lower levels of COVID-19 circulation. Having a way to identify
peoples’ contributions during the game may simulate more similar situations to those outside the
laboratory and more significant results. These limitations could explain why some of the results
contradict those of other studies conducted that are similar in nature to the one completed here.
Future studies should be done with a larger and more diverse population more representative of
the general population.
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Appendices
Appendix A: Research Information Sheet
Research Information Sheet
Title of Research Project:
The Relationship Between Adherence to COVID-19 Regulations and The Public Goods Game
Principal Investigator:
Taylor Clark
Faculty Sponsor:
Professor Sara Solnick
Funding:
FOUR Mini-Grant
Introduction:
You have been invited to participate in this research study because you are age 18 or older at the
University of Vermont. This study is being conducted by Taylor Clark at the University of
Vermont.
Purpose
The purpose of this study is to examine the connection between subjects’ behavior and
cooperation within a laboratory and outside the laboratory.
Study Procedures
You will be asked to complete a survey and play an online interactive game with another group
of participants. Eight participants in this session will complete the interactive game as a group.
The survey will ask you questions about your actions and opinions of COVID-19 protocols
during the COVID-19 Pandemic.
After completing the survey, you will be given further instructions for completing the online
interactive game. After the instructions have been read, there will be an opportunity to ask any
questions you have.
Study participation will take place in a lab at the University of Vermont and will take a total of
approximately one hour.
Benefits
Although, as a participant in this study, you may not directly benefit from this study, it is hoped
that the information gained from the study will help me complete my honors thesis project and
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learn more about the relationship between behavior inside a controlled experiment and outside
the laboratory, in the real world.
Risks
Your participation in this study does not involve any physical or emotional risk to you beyond
that of everyday life.
Please note that although our research will take precautions to ensure your confidentiality, there
is always a chance that your confidentiality could get breached.
Please tell the researcher, Taylor Clark, if you believe that you have been injured due to taking
part in this study. You can tell the researcher by calling or texting (802)-272-0400 with any
questions or concerns you have.
Costs
There are no costs to you, the participant, associated with participating in this study.
Compensation
You will receive $6 for completing the session, and receive additional compensation based on
you and your group members decisions during the interactive activity.
Confidentiality
To protect your confidentiality, we will not use your name or any other personal information that
would identify you when reporting on the data collected during the research study to protect your
confidentiality.
If the results of this study are published or presented, individual names and other personally
identifiable information will not be used.
I ask that everyone in the group not repeat what they have heard others say, but there is always a
chance someone will repeat what you have said. Everything you say will be kept confidential by
the researchers.
Please note that none of the answers you provide in the survey will be used to take any actions
against you. It is strictly a questionnaire used to collect data for the analysis in this research
study. It will not be used for anything other than this research study.
You will be required to provide your name and address each time you receive a payment.
Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You are free to not answer any questions or withdraw at
any time. You may choose not to take part in this study, or if you decide to take part, you can
change your mind later and withdraw from the study. If you leave the research study before it is
finished, the data collected before you leave will not be included in the project analysis.
Questions
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You may contact Taylor Clark, the Investigator in charge of this study, at (802)-272-0400 for
more information about this study. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant
in a research project or for more information on how to proceed should you believe that you have
been harmed as a result of your participation in this study, you should contact the Director of the
Research Protections Office at the University of Vermont at 802-656-5040.
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Appendix B: COVID-19 Survey
COVID-19 Survey
Please answer the following questions as honestly as you can. No actions will be taken for any
responses you provide. The responses you provide will be kept confidential.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions and Taylor will come to your station to answer
your question.
*Required
12. ID Number (Number on card Provided) *
_______________
13. Have you received the COVID-19 vaccination? *
a. Yes, I am fully vaccinated.
b. No, but I am currently in the process of becoming fully vaccinated.
c. No, I have not been vaccinated at all, but I plan to receive my vaccination in the
future.
d. No, I have not been vaccinated and do not plan to receive my vaccination in the
future.
14. Have you received your COVID-19 booster shot? *
a. This is not applicable. I have not received my COVID-19 vaccination.
b. I have not received my COVID-19 booster shot and no not plan to receive it.
c. I have not received my COVID-19 booster shot, but plant to receive it in the near
future.
d. I have received my COVID-19 booster shot.
15. If you have received the COVID-19 vaccination, would you have received it if no one
required you to be vaccinated? *
a. Yes
b. No
c. Not Applicable. I have not received the COVID-19 vaccination.
16. Do you wear a mask when you are required to? *
a. Yes, all the time.
b. Yes, most of the time.
c. Sometimes.
d. No
17. Do you wear a mask indoors when you are not required to? *
a. Yes
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b. Most of the time
c. Sometimes
d. No
18. Do you wear a mask outdoors when not required to, but around a group of people? *
a. Yes
b. Most of the time
c. Sometimes
d. No
19. Do you use hand sanitizer and/or wash your hands frequently? *
a. Yes, very frequently
b. Yes, frequently
c. Sometimes
d. No
20. Would you encourage someone you know to get vaccinated if they had not yet received
their vaccination? *
a. No, I would not encourage them to get vaccinated.
b. Only if I know the well enough would I encourage them to get vaccinated.
c. Yes, I would encourage them to get vaccinated.
21. Suppose your friend is feeling symptoms of COVID-19 and has been tested but is waiting
the results. What would you advice you friend to do? *
a. Isolate until test result is received.
b. Try to isolate and wear a mask indoors when they are around others until test
results are received.
c. It is okay to continue with daily activities until test results are received.
22. If you have been in contact with someone who has tested positive for COVID-19, what
would you do? *
a. I would not get tested and continue conducting my day normally, unless I started
showing symptoms of COVID-19.
b. I would get tested for COVID-19 and conduct my day normally until a positive
test result was given.
c. I would get tested for COVID-19 and isolate myself until a negative test result
was received.
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Appendix C: Online Interactive Game Instructions
Online Interactive Game Instructions
Now that you have completed the survey, you will complete an online interactive game.
Game Format:
You will complete 12 rounds with the same 8 people. Each round, you will receive 12 tokens, at
which point you will decide how many tokens to contribute to a public fund and how many to
keep in your personal fund. All the tokens contributed to the public fund by your entire group
will be multiplied by 2 and distributed equally to all the group members. You can contribute
between 0 and 12 tokens to the public fund.
During the game, you will not be able to see anyone’s name or the decisions they make, and no
one will be able to see your name or the decisions you make. Each player will only be able to see
the total amount of tokens contributed to the public fund by the group.
Tokens:
Each token is worth $1. You will receive 12 tokens at the start of each round. You cannot
transfer tokens to another round when deciding how much to contribute to the public fund.
Payment:
You will receive a cash payment at the conclusion of the study, based on one round of the online
interactive game. After all rounds of the interactive game have been completed, a die will be
rolled to determine which round you will be compensated for. The tokens you had at the end of
the chosen round will be converted to the amount you will be paid. For every token you have at
the end of the chosen round, you will receive $1. The amount you earn will be paid in cash
before you leave and after you have signed a receipt for the amount.
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Example:
Player Tokens at the
beginning of
the Round

Tokens
Contributed to
the Public Fund

Tokens in the
Personal Fund
(Column 2 Column 3)

Tokens received
from the Public
Fund (50*2/8 =
12.5)

Total
Tokens at
the end of
the Round

1

12

12

0

12.5

12.5

2

12

4

8

12.5

20.5

3

12

7

5

12.5

17.5

4

12

10

2

12.5

14.5

5

12

3

9

12.5

21.5

6

12

8

4

12.5

16.5

7

12

0

12

12.5

24.5

8

12

6

6

12.5

18.5

Total Tokens
Contributed =
50
Total tokens contributed to the public fund are multiplied by two and then divided equally
between all eight players. So, 50 tokens that were contributed to the public fund by various
players are multiplied by 2 (50 * 2) to get 100 tokens in the public fund to be distributed equally
to all 8 players (100 / 8), which means that each of the 8 players will receive 12.5 tokens from
the public fund.
Please note the only details provided to you during the game are the total tokens contributed to
the public fund and the total tokens in your procession at the end of the round.
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Quiz Question:
Please take a few minutes to complete the following table using the information presented above.
All tokens contributed to the public fund are multiplied by two before being divided equally
between all players.
Player Tokens at the
beginning of
the Round

Tokens
Contributed to
the Public
Fund

1

12

12

2

12

9

3

3

12

10

2

4

12

7

5

5

12

6

6

12

5

7

7

12

11

1

8

12

4
Total Tokens
Contributed =
64

Tokens in the Tokens
Personal
received from
Fund
the Public
Fund

Total Tokens at
the End of the
Round
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Appendix D: Online Platform Setup
Online Platform Setup
This online interactive game will be played on a website called veconlab. You will register as a
participant using the information on the notecard provided to you upon your arrival at the
session.
Begin by typing veconlab into the search bar and clicking the first link that appears. You will
then click the second option, “Login as Participant.”

Then click login in the next screen (Seen below):

Entering the Session:
Then you will enter the Session ID provided on your notecard in the space where your session
name is asked for.
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Creating an Account:
Next, you will be asked to create an account. Please enter the ID number provided to you on
your ID card in the space for your first name and UVM in the space for your last name. For
example, if the ID Number provided on someone’s notecard were ID1, they would enter the
following:

If you would like, you can create an optional password before proceeding to the instructions
provided by veconlab in case you get logged out and need to rejoin the session.
You will be ready to begin the interactive game once you have:
• Entered the session
• Created an account
• Read the instructions veconlab provides
• Answered the questions veconlab asks about the game
• Asked any questions you have
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Once you have started the game on veconlab, you will encounter a drop-down menu that will
allow you to choose how many tokens you would like to keep for your personal fund and how
many you would like to contribute to the public fund.

Once you have decided how many tokens you would like to contribute to the public fund and
keep in your personal fund, you can click submit, at which point you will be asked to confirm
your decision or change your decision, as seen in the image below.

You will need to wait to know your earnings for each round until everyone has made their
decision and confirmed it.
During the game, please refrain from communicating with your group members or anyone other
than myself if you have any questions once the interactive game begins.

